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Abstract
I estimate demand for health insurance using consumer-level data from the California and Washington
ACA marketplaces. I use the demand estimates to simulate the impact of policies targeting adverse
selection, including subsidies and the individual mandate. I find (1) high own-premium elasticities of
−6.9 to −7.8, but low insurance coverage elasticities of −0.5 to −0.6; (2) minimal response to the man-
date penalty amount, but significant response to the penalty’s existence, suggesting consumers have a
“taste for compliance”; (3) mandate repeal has minimal effect on consumer surplus because ACA sub-
sidies already mitigate adverse selection by shielding most consumers from premium increases; and (4)
mandate repeal reduces average annual consumer surplus by up to $1, 500 if consumers were exposed
to premium increases under voucher-type systems, instead of ACA subsidies. The economic rationale
for the mandate depends on the extent of adverse selection and the presence of other policies targeting
selection.
Keywords: Insurance; Health reform; Individual mandate; Adverse selection
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Introduction
Design of viable health insurance markets remains a key focus of public policy debates following the
2016 presidential election. One of the principal challenges in achieving efficient health insurance mar-
kets is the presence of adverse selection (Arrow, 1963). Strategies adopted under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) for mitigating adverse selection include both policy “carrots,” such as
subsidies for purchasing health insurance, and policy “sticks,” such as penalties for not having insur-
ance. In order to understand the efficacy of these strategies, policymakers need to better understand
how consumers respond to financial incentives when choosing health insurance plans.
In this paper, I analyze insurance choice behavior in the ACA marketplaces. The ACA marketplaces
provide an appealing context for analyzing how consumers choose plans. First, the ACA contains both
policy carrots and sticks that incentivize enrollment. Second, analysis of the ACA setting helps to ad-
dress many of the data shortcomings and generalizability concerns of prior analyses in other settings,
including the pre-ACA individual market, employer market, and Medicare. Studies of the pre-ACA
individual market suffer from measurement error of key variables such as premiums, plan benefit struc-
ture, and choice sets due to the absence of a centralized, regulated market for collecting data (Auerbach
and Ohri, 2006). Employer coverage studies often have minimal consumer heterogeneity, as well as lim-
ited product heterogeneity (83 percent of firms offer just one plan (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016)).
Medicare analyses are limited to the elderly (over age 65) and Medigap plan benefit structures are
tightly regulated. In contrast, ACA consumers are highly diverse and have access to a wide range of
plans.
My analysis uses consumer-level data that I obtained from the California and Washington state mar-
ketplaces. Across the 2014 and 2015 plan years, my data contain about 2.5 million records in California
and 335, 000 records in Washington, accounting for approximately 15 to 20 percent of nationwide mar-
ketplace enrollment (Department of Health and Human Services, 2015). In addition to the consumer
plan choice, I observe key demographic characteristics including age, income, gender, county of resi-
dence, smoking status, and race. Consumers purchasing coverage in 2015 had access to an average of
24 plans in California and 46 plans in Washington. Heterogeneous firm entry across county markets
creates significant variation about these averages, helping to identify consumer substitution patterns
between insurance plans.
Using these data, I estimate discrete choice models of consumer demand for health insurance in both
states. My empirical findings suggest that marketplace consumers are highly premium sensitive on the
intensive margin (i.e., between marketplace plans). In particular, I estimate mean plan own-premium
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elasticities of demand from the insurer’s perspective of −7.8 in California and −6.9 in Washington.1 In
contrast, I find that consumers are relatively inelastic on the extensive margin (i.e., between purchasing
any marketplace plan or choosing to forgo insurance). I estimate marketplace coverage elasticities of
−0.6 in California and −0.5 in Washington under the assumption that the subsidy does not adjust
to premium changes (e.g., under a voucher system). However, marketplace coverage elasticities aver-
age −0.1 in California and −0.2 in Washington after accounting for ACA subsidies that shield most
consumers from premium shocks. My data also allow me to compare premium sensitivity across demo-
graphic groups. I find that the “young invincible” population between ages 18 and 34, racial minorities,
and smokers, are considerably more premium elastic.
My demand estimates also indicate that the mandate penalty amount has little impact on consumer
choice, but the penalty’s existence motivates some consumers to purchase insurance. Assessing al-
ternative explanations for this result, I find evidence of a “taste for compliance” with the individual
mandate that has been theorized in the ACA literature (Saltzman et al., 2015) (Frean et al., 2016).
A taste for compliance is a consumer preference for being socially responsible and complying with the
law, regardless of the penalty amount. Alternatively, the taste for compliance could be described as an
aversion to paying a fine or experiencing a loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).
After estimating demand, I use the estimates to simulate the impact of repealing the individual man-
date. The mandate represents an economic tradeoff between mollifying the premium-increasing effects
of adverse selection and forcing people to purchase insurance against their will. I find that repealing
the individual mandate has minimal net effect on average consumer surplus because the ACA’s subsi-
dies are a potent policy counterweight to adverse selection (i.e., by shielding consumers from premium
increases). In contrast, repealing the mandate under a voucher-type model that shifts the full burden
of premium fluctuations to consumers would result in a sharp decline in average consumer surplus.
Hence, the policy rationale for the individual mandate depends on the extent of adverse selection and
the presence of other policies designed to curb adverse selection.
I make several contributions to the literature. First, my empirical work is the first to examine insurance
choice in the ACA marketplaces across multiple years and states at the consumer level. My data allow
me to make credible estimates of consumer premium elasticities in the ACA marketplaces. Second, I
formalize the notion of a taste for compliance with the mandate in terms of compensating variation and
find empirical evidence to support the hypothesized taste for compliance. This result has important
implications for the efficacy of policy sticks relative to policy carrots in incentivizing the purchase of
health insurance. Third, my counterfactual analysis reveals an important interaction between policies
1Because most consumers are subsidized, insurers receive more than consumers pay, resulting in higher premium
elasticity estimates from the insurer’s perspective.
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targeting adverse selection that deserves deliberate discussion in the health reform debate.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 surveys the relevant literature. Section 2 provides a
brief overview of the ACA. Section 3 describes the empirical methods used in the study. Results on
premium sensitivity and consumer response to the individual mandate are presented in Sections 4 and
5, respectively. Section 6 considers the impact of repealing the mandate, followed by a discussion in
Section 7.
1 Previous Literature
Previous work considering insurance plan choice has largely focused on the employer (group) market or
Medicare. The literature on the pre-ACA individual market is far less extensive because of significant
data limitations. In particular, pre-ACA individual market studies largely rely on national survey
data in which the relevant sample is very small, limiting the potential for focused studies or natural
experiments (Auerbach and Ohri, 2006). Accurate measurement of key variables, such as premiums,
plan characteristics, and consumer choice sets, is difficult because a centralized exchange for purchas-
ing insurance did not exist. Table 1 summarizes estimates from several prominent studies that have
estimated the premium elasticity of demand for individual market coverage. Most studies have found
that demand for pre-ACA individual market insurance is relatively inelastic, estimating an elasticity
for coverage of approximately −0.5 (Glied et al., 2002).
Several recent studies have considered the experience of the 2006 health reform law in Massachusetts,
which established a health insurance marketplace. There are several important differences with the
ACA marketplaces that limit analysis of policies influencing consumer incentives. First, individuals
with incomes below 300 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) were assigned a cost sharing level
based on their income level, greatly restricting their choice sets relative to the ACA marketplaces. Sec-
ond, consumers with incomes above 300 percent of FPL were ineligible for financial assistance. Table 1
indicates elasticity estimates for coverage in Massachusetts were quite low, similar to the pre-ACA
individual market.
There are two working papers analyzing plan choice in the ACA marketplaces. Tebaldi (2016) uses 2014
plan-level data from California. Data at the plan-level suffer from measurement error of key variables
such as the premium and choice sets, which are determined at the consumer level. Frean et al. (2016)
use data from the 2012-2014 American Community Survey (ACS) to study take-up of marketplace cov-
erage, estimating a premium elasticity of demand for marketplace coverage of −0.05 to −0.09. They
also find that the individual mandate penalty had little impact on consumer decision-making. The ACS
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Table 1: Elasticity Estimates from Previous Studies
Coverage Own-Premium
Popula-
tion
Type of Data Elast.
Semi-
Elast.
Elast.
Semi-
Elast.
Pre-ACA Individual Market
Gruber and Poterba (1994)
Self-
employed
Survey data
-0.5 to
-1.0
Marquis and Long (1995)
Working
families
Survey data
-0.3 to
-0.6
Marquis et al. (2004)
Califor-
nia
Survey data
-0.2 to
-0.4
Auerbach and Ohri (2006)
Single
workers
Survey data -0.59
Massachusetts Connector
Chan and Gruber (2010)
Low-
Income
Individual-
level admin.
data
-0.65 to
-0.72
-0.85 to
-1.54
Ericson and Starc (2015)
High-
Income
Transaction-
level admin.
data
-1 to -3
Jaffe and Shepard (2016)
Low-
Income
Individual-
level admin.
data
-1.09 to
-1.29
-1.07
-2.27 to
-2.55
ACA Marketplaces
Tebaldi (2016)
Califor-
nia
Plan-level
admin. data
-1.09 to
-12.89
-1.0 to
-3.1
Frean et al. (2016) National Survey data
-0.05 to
-0.09
does not directly ask participants whether they have marketplace coverage. Hence, data limitations
have hampered previous analyses of the ACA marketplaces. In this paper, I overcome many of these
data challenges by using consumer-level data that contain the precise demographic information used
in rating policies and in determining financial assistance and penalties.
2 Institutional Background on the ACA Marketplaces
One of the key ACA mechanisms for expanding health insurance is the creation of state insurance
marketplaces, where eligible nonelderly individuals under age 65 can receive subsidies to purchase in-
dividual insurance.2 The ACA implements community rating in the marketplaces, restricting insurer
premium variation to the enrollee’s age, smoking status, and geographic residence. Insurers can charge
a 64-year old up to 3 times as much as a 21-year old according to the default age rating curve (Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013). Furthermore, smokers can be charged 50 percent more
than non-smokers, although some states including California prohibit tobacco rating. Each state also
2Certain individuals over the age of 65 who are ineligible for Medicare may also be eligible for subsidies.
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defines geographic rating areas, usually composed of counties, in which an insurer’s premiums must be
the same for consumers of the same age and smoking status. Insurers can opt to enter only a subset
of counties within a rating area. Therefore, consumer choice sets vary across rating areas and within
rating areas, providing a useful source of identifying variation. Individuals purchasing coverage can
pick from one of the four metal tiers: bronze, silver, gold, and platinum. Bronze has an actuarial
value of 60 percent, while silver, gold, and platinum have actuarial values of 70, 80, and 90 percent,
respectively. Select individuals, including those under age 30, can buy a more basic catastrophic plan.
Financial assistance is available to consumers who have household income3 between 100 percent and
400 percent of FPL, do not have access to an “affordable” employer plan offer as either an employee
of dependent,4 are ineligible for public insurance such as Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (CHIP), and are citizens or have legal resident status. ACA premium subsidies limit a
household’s premium contribution to the benchmark plan (defined as the second-lowest cost silver plan
available to the consumer) to a certain percentage of income, where the percentage increases with in-
come. In 2014, the benchmark premium contribution limit was 2 percent of income for households with
income between 100 and 138 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and 9.5 percent for households
with income between 300 and 400 percent of FPL. Consumers can apply the subsidy to the purchase
of any metal plan.5 Consumers with incomes less than or equal to 250 percent of poverty can access
cost sharing subsidies by purchasing a silver plan. Cost sharing subsidies increase the actuarial value
of the base silver plan from 70 percent to 94, 87, and 73 percent for individuals with incomes below
150 percent of FPL, 150 and 200 percent of FPL, and 200 and 250 percent of FPL, respectively. Silver
is the most commonly selected metal tier because of the requirement to purchase a silver plan to access
cost sharing subsidies.
Another key provision of the ACA is the individual mandate which requires most individuals to pur-
chase insurance or pay a penalty. Exemptions from the individual mandate are made for certain groups,
most notably for (1) those with income below the tax filing threshold and (2) individuals who lack ac-
cess to a health insurance plan that is less than 8 percent of their income.6 Both exemption groups
involve sharp income thresholds, providing useful sources of variation. The penalty amount was phased
in between 2014 and 2016. In 2014, the penalty for a single individual equaled the greater of $95 and 1
percent of income. By 2016, the penalty had increased to the greater of $695 and 2.5 percent of income.
3More precisely, modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) as reported on Form 1040 of the federal income tax return
4An “affordable” employer plan is defined as one for which the employee’s contribution to the employer’s single coverage
plan is less than 9.5 percent in 2014 and 9.56 percent in 2015 of the employee’s household income. Note that the employee
contribution for family coverage does not play a role in determining affordability for dependents. Health policymakers
have termed this affordability definition as the “family glitch” (Brooks, 2014)
5That is, any bronze, silver, gold or platinum plan, but not a catastrophic plan.
6This percentage is subject to increase. It was 8 percent in 2014, 8.05 percent in 2015, 8.13 percent in 2016, and 8.16
percent in 2017.
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3 Methods
3.1 Study Data
One of the distinguishing features of this study is the use of detailed consumer-level administrative data
to estimate demand for health insurance. In particular, I obtain enrollee data from Covered California
and the Washington Health Benefit Exchange (WAHBE), the ACA marketplaces in California and
Washington, respectively. The data indicate each enrollee’s selected plan for the 2014 and 2015 plan
years and key demographic information, including age, income, gender, county of residence, and subsidy
eligibility. Additional demographic variables that are available for Washington include race, smoking
status, and coverage start and end dates. Individual and household identifiers allow consumers to be
grouped into household units and tracked across time. There are approximately 2.5 million unique
records in the California data and 335, 000 unique records in the Washington data across the two plan
years.
Estimation of demand for marketplace coverage also requires data on those who chose not to purchase
insurance. I use data from the 2014 and 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) for this purpose
(Ruggles et al., 2016). I apply several criteria to select the ACS sample. First, I do not include any in-
dividuals enrolled in or eligible for another source of coverage, such as Medicaid, the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP), and employer-sponsored insurance. Second, I exclude undocumented im-
migrants who are ineligible to purchase marketplace insurance. I merge the remaining California and
Washington ACS survey records with the administrative data from California and Washington, respec-
tively, to form the universe of potential consumers. There are approximately 23, 000 California and
3, 500 Washington ACS survey records in the final sample, representing about 2.8 million people in
California and 440, 000 people in Washington when survey weights are applied.7
I also collect plan characteristic data from Covered California (California Health Benefit Exchange,
2016) and WAHBE (Office of the Insurance Commissioner Washington State, 2016a), as well as rate
filings from both states (Department of Managed Health Care, 2016) (Office of the Insurance Com-
missioner Washington State, 2016b). Key plan characteristics include the premium, plan metal tier,
plan cost sharing requirements (e.g., deductible, coinsurance, and maximum out-of-pocket limit), and
network type (e.g., HMO, PPO). I can precisely map the plan data to each consumer’s menu of choices
in the marketplaces using the three permitted ACA rating criteria age, smoking status, and county of
residence.
7Note that administrative data from the marketplaces are unweighted, while the ACS requires survey weights to be
representative of the population.
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Table 2 displays summary statistics for California and Washington consumers. The silver tier is the
most commonly selected option because consumers eligible for cost sharing reductions (CSRs) must
choose a silver plan to receive CSRs. Approximately 68 percent of California enrollees and 61 percent
of Washington enrollees are eligible for CSRs, while 91 percent of California enrollees and 85 percent of
Washington enrollees are eligible for premium subsidies. The proportion of consumers exempt from the
individual mandate is small, but is notably higher among those who are uninsured. The uninsured rate
is substantially higher among young adults and males in both states. Smokers and certain minority
groups in Washingto are also more likely to be uninsured. Individuals with incomes between 250 and
400 percent of FPL, who receive relatively small subsidies, and those with incomes above 400 percent
of FPL, who are ineligible for subsidies, make up a large share of the uninsured sample.8
Variation in consumer choice sets is considerable, as shown in Table 3. The average California con-
sumer could select from about 5 insurers offering a total of 25 plans in both plan years. In 2014,
the average Washington consumer had access to 5.5 insurers offering a total of 26.2 plans; by 2015,
Washington consumers could select from 6.8 insurers offering a total of 45.8 plans. Plan premiums
vary considerably by geography and time even within a single metal tier, particularly in California.
The benchmark silver plan premium was about 65 percent more expensive in Monterrey County, CA
than in Los Angeles County, CA. Geographic premium variation is less in Washington because state
regulation prohibits premium variation of more than 15 percent across rating areas. This variation in
choice sets and premiums is particularly useful for estimating demand for health insurance.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
I now develop an empirical model for estimating demand for health insurance in the ACA marketplaces.
I estimate demand at the household level rather than the consumer level for several reasons: (1)
insurance decisions are likely to account for the health and financial needs of all household members,
(2) decisions between household members are likely to be highly correlated (e.g., a 5-year old child is
unlikely to be making independent insurance decisions), and (3) subsidies and penalties are calculated
at the household level. Normalize the utility of the outside option Ui0 ≡ 0 for all households i ∈ I and
define the indirect utility Uij of household i ∈ I for marketplace plan j ∈ J as
Uij ≡ αpij + x′jβ + d′iϕ+ pijd′iγ + ξij + ij (1)
8Another reason middle- to higher-income people make up a large share of the ACS sample is that many of the low-
income uninsured do not meet the sample inclusion criteria (i.e., many are eligible for Medicaid or CHIP and/or could be
undocumented immigrants).
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Table 2: Choice and Demographic Distribution by State
California Washington
Marketplace Uninsured Marketplace Uninsured
Metals
Catastrophic 0.7 0.4
Bronze 24.0 36.6
Silver 64.9 55.1
Gold 5.5 7.7
Platinum 4.8 0.2
Network Type
HMO 45.7 38.5
PPO 45.1 61.4
EPO 9.2 0.0
Income
0% to 138% of FPL 2.9 2.8 5.0 4.3
138% to 150% of FPL 15.0 5.4 8.5 4.6
150% to 200% of FPL 33.8 20.5 30.3 18.0
200% to 250% of FPL 17.4 16.2 18.7 17.3
250% to 400% of FPL 22.7 29.6 25.0 30.9
400%+ of FPL 8.2 25.4 12.5 25.0
Subsidy Eligibility
Premium tax credits 90.7 74.6 85.5 75.0
Cost sharing reduction subsidies 68.5 44.9 61.4 44.2
Penalty Status
Exempt 3.8 6.3 5.3 9.5
Subject 96.2 93.7 94.7 90.5
Age
0-17 4.8 3.2 0.3 2.9
18-25 10.4 20.9 8.5 19.1
26-34 15.7 25.5 17.5 25.2
35-44 15.6 17.0 17.4 19.9
45-54 24.4 17.8 22.6 16.6
55-64 29.0 15.4 33.8 16.3
Gender
Female 52.3 43.1 54.1 40.8
Male 47.7 56.9 45.9 59.2
Race
Asian 14.9 8.8
Black/African American 2.9 3.6
Other Race 5.4 12.1
White 76.8 75.5
Smoking Status
Non-Smoker 91.1 70.2
Smoker 8.9 29.8
Year
2014 48.9 58.9 48.0 56.5
2015 51.1 41.1 52.0 43.5
Average Annual Population 1,239,268 1,407,430 168,785 218,797
NOTES: Columns 2 and 4 indicate the distribution of enrollment in Covered California and WAHBE, respectively,
based on 2014 and 2015 administrative data from the two marketplaces. Columns 3 and 5 summarize the distribution of
enrollment of the uninsured who meet the inclusion criteria described in the text, based on 2014 and 2015 survey data
from the ACS.
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Table 3: Insurers, Plans, and Premiums by State and Year
California Washington
2014 2015 2014 2015
Insurers Available
Minimum 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0
Median 5.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
Average 4.8 4.7 5.5 6.8
Maximum 6.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Plans Available
Minimum 5.0 10.0 16.0 21.0
Median 25.0 25.0 28.0 47.0
Average 24.6 24.5 26.2 45.8
Maximum 35.0 35.0 31.0 61.0
Silver Plan Premiums
County Average $309.70 $320.25 $306.00 $303.46
Minimum $221.56 $230.31 $234.72 $218.55
Maximum $480.59 $554.26 $369.11 $363.24
Minimum second-lowest $253.27 $257.19 $260.01 $252.67
Maximum second-lowest $422.58 $423.67 $312.61 $297.00
NOTES: The first two panels provide summary statistics on the number of insurers and plans available to consumers.
The third panel shows variation in silver plan premiums for a 40-year old nonsmoker.
where pij is household i’s premium contribution for plan j relative to the outside option (i.e., after
deducting the household’s premium subsidy and penalty), xj is a vector of observed product character-
istics, di is a vector of demographic characteristics, ξij is a vector of unobserved product characteristics
which may vary over households, and ij is an error term with distribution function F (·). The utility
function parameters α, β, ϕ, and γ correspond to the variables pij , xj , di, and the interaction term
pijdi respectively. The demographic intercepts d
′
i indicate each demographic’s taste for marketplace
insurance, all else equal, and are identified because they do not appear in the utility of the outside
option. The interaction term pijdi indicates how premium sensitivity varies by demographic.
In the vector xj of product characteristics, I include the plan actuarial value and an indicator for an
HMO plan. I capture the considerable variation in benefit structure within metal tiers in Washington
by including the ratio of each plan’s deductible and maximum out-of-pocket limit to the maximum
value of these parameters in the plan’s metal tier.9 A potentially important product characteristic that
is omitted from the demand model is the breadth or quality of the plan provider network. I incorporate
firm fixed effects, which are likely to be highly correlated with the provider network, to address this
9Recall that plan benefit structures are standardized within metal tiers in California.
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concern. In the vector of demographics di, I include age group, income group, gender, household size,
rating area, and year, as well as race and smoking status for Washington only.10 The vector di also
contains an indicator mi of whether the household is subject to the individual mandate.
In my empirical analysis, I model (1) as a nested logit such that the vector of error terms i = {ij}j∈J
has the generalized extreme value distribution. I create two nests: 1) a nest containing all marketplace
plans and 2) a nest containing only the outside option. This two-nest structure addresses the potential
concern that a simple logit model would overestimate substitution to the outside option (which rep-
resents over 50 percent of both state samples) due to a premium change because of its proportional
substitution assumption.11
Several issues complicate estimation of (1). First, the premium variable may be endogenous as it might
be correlated with unobserved product characteristics such as customer service. I adopt the control
function approach of Petrin and Train (2010) to address potential premium endogeneity. Full details of
the approach are given in Appendix A. Second, I do not observe health status or a measure of ex-post
health risk, leading to potential bias of the demographic variable and interaction term coefficients.
Significant variation in choice sets, both within and across rating areas, help to enhance identifica-
tion of the model coefficients. In addition, the complexity of the ACA’s market reforms generates
substantial variation in choice sets and premiums that consumers face. For example, there is a sharp
income threshold at 400 percent of FPL for premium subsidy eligibility and at 250 percent of FPL for
cost sharing subsidy eligibility (and the actuarial value of the cost sharing subsidy plans also changes
abruptly at 150 and 200 percent of FPL). Age breakpoints create choice set and premium variation;
consumers are no longer able to purchase a catastrophic plan upon turning age 30, while young adults
face a 57 percent increase in premiums upon turning age 21 according to the default CMS age rating
curve (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013).
I also estimate the taste for compliance with the individual mandate using the demand estimates of
(1). I define the taste for compliance formally in terms of compensating variation as follows. Consider
the general utility function Uij(pij ,mi), where pij is the premium relative to the outside option (i.e.,
after deducting the premium subsidy and penalty) and mi indicates whether household i is subject to
the penalty as above. Suppose household i purchases plan j and define the premiums p′′ij and p
′
ij such
that Uij(p
′′
ij , 0) = Uij(p
′
ij , 1). That is, p
′′
ij is the premium relative to the outside option that provides
the household with the same utility in a setting where it is exempt from the mandate as in a setting
10I aggregate individual-level demographic variables by calculating the percentage of household members with the
specific individual-level characteristic (e.g., for gender, I calculate the percentage of household members that are male).
11A natural nest structure alternative would be to define each of five plan metal tiers (including catastrophic) as a
separate nest and the outside option as a sixth nest. However, such a partition would be more computationally intensive
and problematic to implement given the ACA’s preferential treatment of certain metal tiers (e.g., cost sharing subsidies
are only available for silver plans).
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where it is subject to the mandate. I define the taste for compliance as the compensating variation
τi = p
′
ij − p′′ij . No taste for compliance exists if τi = 0, in which case a subsidy equal to the amount of
the penalty provides household i with the same utility in both settings. A taste for compliance exists
if τi > 0 and represents the additional premium reduction beyond the amount of the penalty required
to restore the consumer’s utility to its level under the mandate.
If utility takes the linearly separable form in (1), then the taste for compliance is given by τi = ϕmi/αi,
where αi = αi + d
′
iγi and ϕmi is the coefficient of the variable mi in (1). One potential empirical chal-
lenge with estimating ϕmi is collinearity of the penalty and income. The sharp income-based exemption
thresholds, including the filing threshold and affordability criterion, help to address this concern. An-
other challenge in estimating ϕmi is the potential for omitted variable bias. For this reason, I include
all available demographic characteristics in the demographic intercept variable vector di. A potentially
important variable that I am unable to control for is health status.
4 Premium Sensitivity Results
I analyze consumer premium sensitivity by calculating premium elasticities of demand because regres-
sion coefficients in a discrete choice model are difficult to interpret. Appendix B presents full regression
results, Appendix C provides semi-elasticities of demand, and Appendix D contains formulas for com-
puting elasticities and semi-elasticities in the ACA setting.
Table 4 displays mean own-premium elasticities of demand (i.e., intensive margin elasticities). Califor-
nia consumers have a mean own-premium elasticity of −2.9 from the consumer’s perspective and −7.8
from the insurer’s perspective.12 Washington consumers have a mean own-premium elasticity of −2.9
from the consumer’s perspective and −6.9 from the insurer’s perspective. These elasticity estimates
are substantially higher than previous studies of individual market insurance because ACA consumers
have (1) a much larger choice set of plans and (2) a centralized marketplace for readily comparing
alternative plans. The elasticity estimates also suggest that California consumers are more premium
elastic than Washington consumers, possibly due to plan standardization in California.13 California
consumers might place greater weight on the premium because there are fewer non-premium attributes
to discriminate between alternative plan. Variation in premium sensitivity across demographic groups
is consistent with theory. In particular, low-income individuals, young adults (between the ages of 18
and 34), males, non-whites, and smokers are more elastic.
12Recall that consumer perspective elasticities are lower than insurer perspective elasticities because consumers receive
subsidies.
13A larger proportion of California consumers are subsidy-eligible, which explains why the mean consumer-perspective
elasticities are about the same in both states, while the insurer-perspective elasticities are higher in California.
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Table 4: Estimated Mean Own-Premium Elasticities
California Washington
Consumer-
Perspective
Insurer-
Perspective
Consumer-
Perspective
Insurer-
Perspective
Overall -2.9 -7.8 -2.9 -6.9
Income (% of FPL)
0-138 -3.8 -9.7 -6.7 -15.2
138-250 -3.3 -8.4 -3.0 -6.5
250-400 -2.7 -6.8 -2.7 -5.9
400+ -2.7 -6.8 -2.6 -5.7
Gender
Female -2.7 -6.8 -2.8 -6.6
Male -3.0 -8.1 -3.0 -7.1
Age
18-34 -3.5 -9.5 -3.6 -8.8
35-54 -3.3 -8.8 -2.9 -7.1
55+ -2.2 -5.9 -2.1 -5.2
Smoking Status
Smoker -3.4 -8.2
Non-Smoker -2.7 -6.6
Race
Asian -3.1 -7.4
Black -4.7 -11.1
White -2.8 -6.5
Household Size
Single -4.2 -11.4 -3.9 -9.2
Family -2.0 -5.7 -2.4 -5.8
Mandate Status
Exempt -2.3 -6.1 -2.5 -6.0
Subject -3.0 -7.9 -2.9 -6.9
Year
2014 -2.9 -7.7 -3.1 -7.4
2015 -3.0 -7.9 -2.8 -6.6
Notes: Table shows mean own-premium elasticities by demographic group and by state that are computed using
formulas (4) and (5) in Appendix D.
Table 5 presents estimated elasticities for marketplace coverage (i.e., extensive margin elasticities).
I find that consumers are inelastic on the extensive margin, consistent with the previous literature.
California and Washington consumers have elasticities for marketplace coverage of −0.6 and −0.5, re-
spectively, if subsidies do not adjust to the premium change (e.g., vouchers). Premium elasticities are
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−0.1 and −0.2 in California and Washington, respectively, under the ACA subsidy formula that largely
shields consumers from premium fluctuations. Advantages of limiting consumer premium sensitivity on
the extensive margin include reducing market volatility and the potential for adverse selection. Insurers
could, however, exploit consumer premium insensitivity by raising premiums, knowing that subsidies
will largely offset the increase.
I conducted two sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of my findings. First, I ran additional
regressions where I included indicators for the cheapest plan and cheapest silver plan in each house-
hold’s choice set. These tests assess whether consumers gravitate to plans carrying the “cheapest”
designation. Table 11 shows both cheapest plan indicators are positive and statistically significant, but
the coefficient for the cheapest silver plan is substantially larger. This result suggests that CSR-eligible
consumers strategically select the cheapest plan eligible for CSRs. Second, I account for the possibility
of inertia by incorporating an indicator in the vector di for a household renewing marketplace coverage
in 2015. Table 11 in Appendix B indicates that the results are robust to the inclusion of the renewal
indicator.
Assessing the relative importance of non-premium plan characteristics is also important to paint a
complete picture of demand for health insurance. Table 6 displays the estimated non-premium plan
characteristics parameters of (1). The actuarial value (or metal tier) of the plan has a strong positive
impact on household plan selection in both states. Consumers may view the metal tier of the plan as
a convenient signal for plan quality that involves little search effort. The effect of the plan actuarial
value is substantially greater in California than in Washington. Plan standardization may make the
actuarial value a more prominent plan attribute for California consumers. Coefficients for the other
plan characteristics are far smaller in magnitude, suggesting that the plan metal tier represents the
critical non-premium plan characteristic in consumer decision-making.
5 Consumer Response to the Individual Mandate
Contrary to standard economic theory, consumers appear to be relatively insensitive to the amount of
the penalty, but quite sensitive to the existence of a penalty. Table 7 presents estimates of the indi-
vidual mandate parameters for several different functional forms of (1) in addition to the base model
functional form. I find that the mandate compliance variable is positive and statistically significant. In
contrast, the coefficient on the penalty amount in sensitivity runs is either statistically insignificant or
has the wrong (positive) sign, similar to what Frean et al. (2016) found. The estimates imply that the
taste for compliance in Washington is $67 per month, which means that consumers place as much value
in complying with the mandate as a $67 subsidy. The estimated taste for compliance is considerably
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Table 5: Estimated Elasticities for Marketplace Coverage
California Washington
Vouchers
ACA
Subsidies
Vouchers
ACA
Subsidies
Overall -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
Income (% of FPL)
0-138 -0.7 -0.2 -1.2 -0.4
138-250 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2
250-400 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
400+ -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
Gender
Female -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
Male -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2
Age
18-34 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2
35-54 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
55+ -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1
Smoking Status
Smoker -0.6 -0.2
Non-Smoker -0.5 -0.1
Race
Asian -0.6 -0.2
Black -0.8 -0.2
White -0.5 -0.1
Household Size
Single -0.7 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2
Family -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1
Mandate Status
Exempt -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1
Subject -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2
Year
2014 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2
2015 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1
Notes: Table shows elasticities for marketplace coverage by demographic group and by state that are computed using
formula (7) in Appendix D. In the “Vouchers” columns, the cross-partial ∂pij/∂pib is set equal to 0 for all plans
j ∈ J \{b} for all consumers such that the consumer’s subsidized premium does not respond to changes in the benchmark
premium. In the “ACA subsidies” column, ∂pij/∂pib = 1 for all subsidized consumers and all plans j ∈ J \ {b}.
higher in California, but my sensitivity analyses indicate that lack of data on smokers could be a source
of upward bias. As noted above, the taste for compliance estimates could be subject to omitted variable
bias due to lack of data on health status. Table 7 also suggests the presence of potential collinearity
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Table 6: Estimated Parameters of Non-Premium Plan Characteristics
California Washington
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 1.614∗∗
(0.715) (0.642)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗
(0.037) (0.131)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗
(0.022)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011
(0.014)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗
(0.078)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗
(0.092)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗
(0.045)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.083) (0.018)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗
(0.083)
CHPW 0.207∗∗
(0.087)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.142) (0.044)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗
(0.028)
Moda 0.151∗∗
(0.071)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗
(0.042)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗
(0.166)
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗
(0.083)
Valley −0.003
(0.012)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗
(0.039)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table shows parameter estimates for the non-premium plan characteristics. Robust standard errors that correct for
potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge (2010)).
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between the penalty and income.
Table 7: Estimated Individual Mandate Parameters
Base
Separate
Penalty
No
Mandate
Intercept,
Separate
Penalty
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
California
Penalty 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.122) (0.155)
Mandate × > 400% −0.911∗∗∗
(0.212)
Washington
Penalty 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
Mandate 0.181∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.076) (0.109) (0.061)
Mandate × > 400% −1.500∗∗∗
(0.161)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge
(2010)). Table shows parameter estimates for the individual mandate sensitivity runs. Column 2 includes a mandate
intercept, column 3 includes both a mandate intercept and separate penalty, and column 4 includes a separate penalty.
Column 5 adds an interaction between the mandate intercept and an intercept for those earning above 400 percent of
FPL, while column 6 excludes the smoker variables in the Washington analysis.
An alternative hypothesis may hold that cognitive difficulty understanding the complex details of the
mandate, rather than a taste for compliance, explains the response to the existence rather than the
amount of the penalty. I designed a test to assess this hypothesis that distinguishes between the two
primary mandate exemptions: (1) the household has income below the filing threshold and (2) the
household lacks an affordable offer. Ascertaining whether an offer is affordable is a complex cognitive
task, whereas determining whether income is below the filing threshold is a more straightforward ex-
ercise that long pre-dates the ACA. I distinguish between these two mandate exemptions by adding
an interaction of the mandate intercept and the intercept for income above 400 percent of FPL to (1),
as nearly all households with an affordable offer exemption have income just above the 400 percent
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of FPL threshold for receiving subsidies. The fifth column of Table 7 indicates that individuals with
income above 400 percent of FPL are not sensitive to the existence of the mandate, compared to those
with income below 400 percent of FPL. Therefore, those who have a greater challenge in determining
their exemption status are less responsive to the penalty’s existence, indicating that cognitive difficulty
does not drive the sensitivity of consumers to the penalty’s existence.
Another method for evaluating consumer response to the individual mandate is to compare the behav-
ior of those who started coverage at the beginning of the 2014 open enrollment period to those who
waited until just before the deadline for complying with the individual mandate.14 The earliest possible
date to begin coverage during the 2015 open enrollment period was January 1, 2014 and latest possible
date to begin coverage was May 1, 2014. Table 8 provides summary statistics comparing early enrollees
to late enrollees. Late enrollees were less likely to choose a gold or platinum plan and more likely to
select a bronze plan. I also find that late enrollees are more likely to be young adults (i.e., age 26-34),
male, and racial minorities. Table 9 indicates that late enrollees are more premium elastic. Washington
consumers beginning coverage in January 2014 had a mean own-premium elasticity of −6.1 from the
insurer’s perspective. In contrast, those beginning coverage in May 2014 had a mean own-premium
elasticity of −7.3 from the insurer’s perspective. Premium sensitivity is also monotonically increasing
in the coverage start date. These findings suggest that the mandate incentivized lower-risk individuals
to enroll, reducing adverse selection. In contrast, Table 9 indicates a substantially smaller increase in
consumer premium sensitivity during the course of the 2015 open enrollment period when the mandate
had already been in effect for a year.
6 Repealing the Individual Mandate
In this section, I simulate repeal of the individual mandate using the base demand estimates of demand
model (1). A possible empirical strategy for determining the new market equilibrium under mandate
repeal is to combine the demand estimates with firms’ profit functions, and then inverting the first
order conditions of the firms’ profit functions to estimate cost. This empirical strategy depends on
the assumption that the market is currently in equilibrium, which appears to be tenuous given recent
upheaval in the ACA marketplaces. I avoid making this assumption and instead simulate mandate
repeal under a range of firm responses from the microsimulation literature,15 which suggests mandate
repeal would increase premiums by roughly 10 to 25 percent (Eibner and Price, 2012). Most recently,
the Congressional Budget Office estimated individual market premiums would rise by 20 to 25 percent
14Note that I do not observe the coverage term for Covered California consumers, and hence I limit this analysis to
Washington.
15These include analyses by the Congressional Budget Office, Lewin Group, RAND Corporation, Urban Institute, and
Jonathan Gruber.
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Table 8: Choice and Demographic Distribution by Coverage Start Date (WAHBE)
Jan. 2014 Feb. 2014 Mar. 2014 Apr. 2014 May 2014
Metal Tier Choice
Catastrophic 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Bronze 32.5 40.1 40.8 36.9 41.7
Silver 57.3 50.3 51.4 56.5 52.9
Gold 10.1 9.6 7.8 6.5 5.2
Platinum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Network Type Choice
HMO 31.6 34.5 38.0 41.1 41.4
PPO 68.4 65.5 62.0 58.9 58.6
Income
0% to 138% of FPL 3.6 6.8 7.0 6.4 4.6
138% to 150% of FPL 7.8 9.4 10.2 9.3 8.2
150% to 200% of FPL 27.0 30.8 33.1 33.2 32.7
200% to 250% of FPL 17.5 18.0 18.3 18.6 19.3
250% to 400% of FPL 27.2 23.4 21.9 22.4 22.2
400%+ of FPL 16.9 11.6 9.5 10.1 13.0
Subsidy Eligibility
Premium tax credits 82.1 87.6 89.8 89.4 86.2
Cost sharing reduction subsidies 55.3 64.4 68.2 67.2 64.3
Penalty Status
Exempt 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.8 3.9
Subject 93.2 94.2 94.9 95.2 96.1
Age
0-17 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0
18-25 7.5 10.5 9.8 9.6 9.5
26-34 13.3 16.8 18.3 19.1 23.4
35-44 15.2 17.8 18.3 18.6 20.2
45-54 21.9 23.2 24.0 24.0 23.4
55-64 41.4 30.6 28.8 28.0 23.0
65+ 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5
Gender
Female 55.7 54.5 55.0 53.7 49.7
Male 44.3 45.5 45.0 46.3 50.3
Race
Asian 11.4 16.8 19.9 18.8 14.1
Black/African American 1.9 2.8 3.6 4.1 4.7
Other Race 3.5 5.7 6.5 6.6 7.1
White 83.2 74.7 70.0 70.5 74.0
Smoking Status
Non-Smoker 92.6 91.3 90.6 89.9 88.8
Smoker 7.4 8.7 9.4 10.1 11.2
Total population 54,664 24,260 17,536 24,652 27,678
Notes: Table compares Washington marketplace enrollee choices and demographic characteristics by their coverage
initiation dates.
if the individual mandate were repealed (Congressional Budget Office, 2017).
Table 10 shows how repealing the individual mandate would affect marketplace enrollment and con-
20
Table 9: Estimated Mean Own-Premium Elasticities by Coverage Start Date (Washington)
Coverage Start Month
Consumer-
Perspective
Insurer-
Perspective
January 2014 -2.6 -6.1
February 2014 -2.8 -6.7
March 2014 -2.9 -6.9
April 2014 -2.9 -7.0
May 2014 -3.1 -7.3
January 2015 -2.5 -6.0
February 2015 -2.7 -6.3
March 2015 -2.7 -6.5
Notes: Table shows estimated mean own-premium elasticities for Washington marketplace consumers by the coverage
initiation month from the consumer’s and insurer’s perspectives using formulas (4) and (5), respectively.
sumer welfare under two firm response scenarios: a low percentage premium increase (10 percent) and
a high percentage premium increase (25 percent). I find that marketplace enrollment would decline
by 25.5 to 26.3 percent in California and 15.7 to 17.0 percent in Washington, which is on the lower
end of the ACA micro-simulation literature. Repealing the mandate would cause sharper coverage
declines of 30.1 to 37.7 percent in California and 23.4 to 35.9 percent in Washington if vouchers were to
replace ACA subsidies. Mandate repeal has minimal effect on average annual consumer surplus, which
increases by $130 to $230 in California and $117 to $140 in Washington.16 A voucher-type system that
exposes consumers to premium shocks reverses this conclusion; average annual consumer surplus falls
by $361 to $1, 211 in California and $575 to $1, 507 in Washington. These divergent outcomes illustrate
the important interaction between the mandate and other policies targeting adverse selection. ACA
subsidies serve as a strong counterweight to adverse selection by shielding subsidized consumers from
premium increases that could result from mandate repeal, making the mandate somewhat superfluous
in the ACA setting. Exposing consumers to premium increases in a setting with vouchers gives the
mandate a central role in curbing adverse selection. Note that these estimates of consumer welfare
are averages and do not reflect the individual experience of a consumer. They also do not account for
other social welfare impacts of repealing the mandate, such as changes in producer surplus and federal
government spending.
16McFadden (1983) shows that expected consumer surplus can be calculated as CWi =
λ
αi
lnNiEX , where λ is the
nesting parameter and NiEX =
∑
j exp(Uij/λ).
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Table 10: Impact of Repealing the Individual Mandate
Percent Change in
Marketplace Enrollment
Change in Average Annual
Consumer Surplus
Vouchers
ACA
Subsidies
Vouchers
ACA
Subsidies
California
10% Premium Increase -30.1% -25.5% -$361 $203
25% Premium Increase -37.7% -26.3% -$1,211 $130
Washington
10% Premium Increase -23.4% -15.7% -$575 $140
25% Premium Increase -35.9% -17.0% -$1,507 $117
Notes: Table shows the impact on enrollment and average annual consumer surplus of repealing the individual mandate
under a voucher subsidy and under ACA subsidies. Two alternative supply response scenarios are considered: a 10%
premium increase and a 25% premium increase.
7 Conclusion
I estimate demand for health insurance using consumer-level data from two ACA marketplaces. I find
that marketplace consumers in California and Washington are highly premium elastic on the intensive
margin, but premium inelastic on the extensive margin. There is considerable variation in premium
sensitivity across demographic groups, particularly by age. Standardization of plan benefits appears
to make consumers more premium elastic. My results also indicate that the plan metal tier is an
important discriminator in plan choice, as it may be a convenient proxy for plan quality. In addition, I
find evidence that consumers respond to the existence of the mandate penalty, rather than the amount
of the penalty. My analysis indicates that a taste for compliance offers a plausible explanation for this
result, which has important implications for the effectiveness of policy sticks relative to policy carrots.
After estimating demand for health insurance in the ACA marketplaces, I use the demand estimates
to simulate the interaction between alternative subsidy approaches and the individual mandate in mit-
igating adverse selection. My simulations indicate that mandate repeal would have minimal impact on
consumer welfare because ACA subsidies are already a strong policy instrument for reducing adverse
selection. If a voucher-based system that exposes consumers to premium increases were to replace ACA
subsidies, mandate repeal would significantly reduce consumer welfare. Hence, repealing the individual
mandate involves an intricate set of policy interactions that warrant deliberate discussion.
Several caveats should be attached to my empirical results. First, I am unable to control for health
status or ex-post health risk, which could be a source of bias. Second, collinearity between the penalty
amount and income could lead to imprecision in measuring the taste for compliance. Finally, I do not
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have enrollment data for individual market plans offered outside of the marketplaces. Substitution be-
tween on- and off-marketplace individual market plans is likely to be minimal because off-marketplace
plans are ineligible for subsidies and subject to ACA rating rules and risk adjustment. However, it is
conceivable that some of the uninsured in my sample who are ineligible for subsidies might consider an
off-marketplace plan.
Future studies of demand for health insurance can use data from the ACA marketplaces to further un-
derstand how consumers choose plans. In particular, my analysis does not consider the importance of
provider networks, which vary considerably between marketplace firms, in consumer decision-making.
Data in the ACA setting is sufficiently rich to answer key supply-side questions such as which geo-
graphic markets insurers decide to enter and how they set premiums. A stronger understanding of
both the demand-side and supply-side will help researchers characterize the competitive dynamics in
the ACA marketplaces and identify which policy regimes could improve social welfare.
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Appendix A: Description of the Control Function Approach
A key challenge in estimating (1) is identification of the premium parameter αi and interaction term
parameters γi. Premiums are likely to be correlated with unobserved (to the econometrician) product
characteristics ξij , such as speed of processing claims and overall customer service. Failure to account
for these correlations would tend to bias the parameter estimates downwards in magnitude towards
zero. The most common approach to correct for premium endogeneity in a discrete choice model was
developed by Berry et al. (1995) and extended to individual-level data in Berry et al. (2004a). For
consistent parameter estimates, the approach requires that there be more than just zero or a small
number of observed purchases per plan (Berry et al., 2004b), which is violated in my data for some
plans sold by small insurers. In addition, the procedure works by absorbing the premium endogeneity
into product-level constants, which is somewhat problematic in this setting because premiums vary
across households in addition to products.
As an alternative, I use the control function approach of Petrin and Train (2010). To implement the
control function approach, I first regress the insurer’s premium pij against instruments zt. I then
compute the predicted household premiums p̂ij = pij − psi − τi (where psi is the household’s premium
subsidy and τ i is the household’s individual mandate penalty) and obtain the residuals µij = pij − p̂ij .
Following the second approach in Petrin and Train (2010), suppose that the error terms (µij , ξij) are
jointly normal and set ξij = E[ξij |µij ] + ξ˜ij to “control” for potential correlations between µij and ξij .
By properties of normal distributions, it follows that the conditional distribution ξij |µij is also normal
with mean υµij and variance ψ
2 (υ and ψ are parameters to be estimated). Now the model (1) can be
written as
Uij = Vij + E[ξij |µij ] + ξ˜ij + ij
= Vij + υµij + ψηij + ij (2)
where Vij = αpij+x
′
jβ+d
′
iϕ+pijd
′
iγ and ηij ∼ N(0, 1). Note that model (2 has two more parameters to
estimate (υ and ψ), but controls for the endogeneity of premiums. The household choice probabilities
can be computed as
sij =
∫ eV ′ij/λ
(∑
j∈J e
V ′ij/λ
)λ−1
1 +
(∑
j∈J e
V ′ij/λ
)λ
 dG(·) (3)
where V ′ij ≡ Vij+υµij+ψηij and G(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function for ξij |µij . Because
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the integral in (3) does not have an analytical solution, I estimate it using simulation. To estimate the
demand model parameters θ in (1), I use maximum simulated likelihood with log-likelihood function
LL(θ) =
∑
i,j
wicij ln sij(θ)
where wi is the household’s weight and cij takes 1 if household i chose plan j and 0 otherwise.
To construct the instrument vector, I include all non-premium attributes, which are assumed to be
exogenous. From the California and Washington insurer rate filings, I obtain geographic cost factors,
which reflect each insurer’s cost relative to its cost in other rating areas in which it participates. For
example, in 2014, Kaiser had a geographic cost factor of 1.00 in Washington’s rating area 3 and 1.05 in
rating area 2, implying that it expects its cost to be 5 percent greater in rating area 2. In its rate filing,
Kaiser indicates that its provider contracts are more favorable in rating area 3 than in rating area 2.
Because the geographic cost factors are indicative of an insurer’s bargaining leverage with providers
in a given rating area, they should make good instruments in this setting (i.e., they are likely to be
correlated with the premium, but uncorrelated with demand). Note also that many insurers have larger
disparities in cost across geographic regions (e.g., Group Health’s cost factor in rating area 2 was 46
percent greater than its cost factor in rating area 4).
In addition, I include the instruments suggested by Berry et al. (1995). Applied to this setting, these
instruments are for each plan j ∈ J 1) the average value for each plan characteristic k ∈ K1 of all plans
j′ ∈ J, j′ 6= j offered by the firm offering plan j in a given rating area n ∈ N and year t ∈ {2004, 2005}
and 2) the average value for each plan characteristic k ∈ K1 of all plans j′ ∈ J, j′ 6= j not offered
by the firm offering plan j in a given rating area n ∈ N and year t ∈ {2004, 2005}. The idea is to
measure each plan’s isolation in the characteristic space K1, with more “isolated” or less substitutable
products potentially having higher margins. These instruments should be strong in the Washington
model, where products are highly differentiated; however, they might be weak in the California setting,
where plans are standardized. Because of these potential limitations, I also instrument for a plan j ∈ J
being offered in rating area n in year t by calculating the average premium that the insurer charges
for j in other rating areas in the same year. Proposed by Hausman (1997), this instrument reflects
the idea that the unobserved characteristics of a plan j offered in rating area n are correlated with the
premium in rating area n, but not correlated with the premiums in other rating areas.
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Appendix B: Full Regression Results
Table 11: Full Regression Results
California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.304∗∗∗ −0.293∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.020) (0.067) (0.179) (0.037) (0.147)
Cheapest Plan 0.026∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.008) (0.036)
Cheapest Silver Plan 0.253∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗
(0.082) (0.097)
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 2.090∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗∗ 1.614∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗ 1.693∗∗
(0.715) (0.114) (0.647) (0.642) (0.110) (0.715)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗
(0.037) (0.009) (0.040) (0.131) (0.075) (0.114)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗
(0.022) (0.009) (0.047)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011 −0.005 −0.020
(0.014) (0.010) (0.022)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.080) (0.073)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.080) (0.088)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗ 0.071 0.023∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.073) (0.007)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.029 0.023∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.080) (0.060) (0.018) (0.010) (0.001)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.053)
CHPW 0.207∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.074) (0.051)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.142) (0.082) (0.149) (0.044) (0.011) (0.060)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗ 0.072 0.079∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.080) (0.029)
Moda 0.151∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.073) (0.033)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗ −0.115 −0.184∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.080) (0.057)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗
(0.166) (0.077) (0.165)
Continued on next page
28
Table 11 – Continued from previous page
California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.084)
Valley −0.003 −0.001 0.002
(0.012) (0.086) (0.014)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗ 0.113 0.130∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.082) (0.040)
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.045∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.111) (0.026) (0.092)
250-400 0.095∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗
(0.027) (0.015) (0.017) (0.122) (0.027) (0.097)
400+ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗
(0.026) (0.014) (0.016) (0.124) (0.027) (0.100)
Male −0.018∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.010∗ −0.024
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.023)
0-17 0.024 0.021∗∗∗ 0.033∗
(0.017) (0.006) (0.020)
18-34 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.008) (0.033) (0.041) (0.009) (0.040)
35-54 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗
(0.030) (0.006) (0.029) (0.025) (0.006) (0.030)
Smoker −0.055 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.076
(0.034) (0.008) (0.048)
Black −0.143∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.173
(0.081) (0.020) (0.108)
Asian −0.017∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
White 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Family 0.186∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.010) (0.055) (0.038) (0.008) (0.039)
Year 2015 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.004 0.023∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014)
Renewal 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Mandate −0.060∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.033 −0.012∗ −0.051
(0.027) (0.006) (0.031) (0.025) (0.007) (0.038)
Intercept
Continued on next page
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California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base −2.639∗∗∗ −2.532∗∗∗ −2.876∗∗∗ 0.500 0.926∗∗∗ 0.212
(0.724) (0.180) (0.815) (0.962) (0.210) (1.317)
138-250 −0.672∗∗∗ −0.885∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.115) (0.242)
250-400 −1.057∗∗∗ −1.418∗∗∗ −0.915∗
(0.285) (0.128) (0.468)
400+ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.164∗∗∗ −0.981∗∗∗ −1.751∗∗∗ −2.135∗∗∗ −1.592∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.058) (0.194) (0.319) (0.127) (0.508)
Male 0.049 0.146∗∗∗ 0.056 −0.275∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.056) (0.043) (0.067)
0-17 −2.765∗∗∗ −2.877∗∗∗ −2.717∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.111) (0.119)
18-34 −1.461∗∗∗ −1.501∗∗∗ −1.458∗∗∗ −2.027∗∗∗ −1.874∗∗∗ −2.024∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.031)
35-54 −1.135∗∗∗ −1.219∗∗∗ −1.127∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗ −0.619∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.051) (0.045) (0.062) (0.048) (0.065)
Smoker −1.916∗∗∗ −1.922∗∗∗ −1.866∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.058) (0.135)
Black −1.796∗∗∗ −2.155∗∗∗ −1.722∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.102) (0.288)
Asian −0.677∗∗∗ −0.950∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.077) (0.075)
White −1.366∗∗∗ −1.417∗∗∗ −1.352∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.046) (0.066)
Family 1.850∗∗∗ 1.893∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.040) (0.033) (0.059) (0.036) (0.076)
Year 2015 0.417∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.036) (0.036) (0.064) (0.036) (0.058)
Renewal 28.334 4.921∗∗∗
(17,334.230)
(0.155)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.137) (0.082) (0.199) (0.053) (0.087) (0.093)
Rating Areas
WA1 1.123∗∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.040)
CA/WA2 2.322∗∗∗ 2.656∗∗∗ 2.323∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
(0.231) (0.140) (0.195) (0.039) (0.049) (0.036)
CA/WA3 0.810∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.102) (0.099) (0.085) (0.076) (0.090)
WA4 0.277∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.067) (0.075)
CA4/8 2.330∗∗∗ 2.473∗∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.121) (0.150)
CA5 2.228∗∗∗ 2.833∗∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.163) (0.246)
CA6 2.034∗∗∗ 2.269∗∗∗ 2.034∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.119) (0.127)
CA7 2.024∗∗∗ 2.314∗∗∗ 2.040∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.122) (0.149)
CA9 1.227∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.126) (0.123)
CA10 −0.260 0.057 −0.331∗∗
(0.165) (0.107) (0.164)
CA11 −1.210∗∗∗ −1.156∗∗∗ −1.247∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.123) (0.110)
CA12 1.509∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.500∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.112) (0.117)
CA14 −1.499∗∗∗ −1.329∗∗∗ −1.474∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.127) (0.098)
CA15 −0.036 0.249∗∗∗ −0.038
(0.114) (0.086) (0.097)
CA16 0.573∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.083) (0.078)
CA17 −0.893∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗∗ −0.865∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.088) (0.080)
CA18 0.573∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.090) (0.112)
CA19 0.595∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.088) (0.112)
Nesting Parameter 0.184∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.063) (0.010) (0.069) (0.076) (0.012) (0.098)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge
(2010)). Table shows full regression results for the base case, as well as the inertia and cheapest plan sensitivity runs.
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Table 12: Control Function Regression Results
California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.304∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗ −0.532∗∗
(0.087) (0.103) (0.179) (0.257)
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 2.147∗∗ 1.614∗∗ 1.642∗
(0.715) (0.960) (0.642) (0.927)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.287
(0.037) (0.047) (0.131) (0.187)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗ −0.051
(0.022) (0.031)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011 −0.006
(0.014) (0.016)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗
(0.078) (0.109)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗
(0.092) (0.126)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗ 0.090
(0.045) (0.064)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.029 0.028
(0.083) (0.110) (0.018) (0.025)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.083) (0.112)
CHPW 0.207∗∗ 0.209∗
(0.087) (0.127)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.100
(0.142) (0.193) (0.044) (0.062)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.028) (0.035)
Moda 0.151∗∗ 0.152
(0.071) (0.102)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗ −0.147∗
(0.042) (0.079)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗ 0.379
(0.166) (0.239)
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(0.083) (0.111)
Valley −0.003 −0.012
(0.012) (0.018)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.039) (0.041)
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.045∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.111) (0.151)
250-400 0.095∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.324∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.122) (0.166)
400+ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.331∗
(0.026) (0.031) (0.124) (0.177)
Male −0.018∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.017 −0.017
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024)
0-17 0.024 0.030
(0.017) (0.028)
18-34 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗
(0.036) (0.052) (0.041) (0.062)
35-54 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.065∗
(0.030) (0.045) (0.025) (0.035)
Smoker −0.055 −0.056
(0.034) (0.039)
Black −0.143∗ −0.144
(0.081) (0.116)
Asian −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
White 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Family 0.186∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.060) (0.087) (0.038) (0.056)
Year 2015 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.027
(0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.019)
Mandate −0.060∗∗ −0.060 −0.033 −0.033
(0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.029)
Intercept
Base −2.639∗∗∗ −2.671∗∗ 0.500 0.487
(0.724) (1.116) (0.962) (1.397)
138-250 −0.672∗∗∗ −0.678∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.131)
250-400 −1.057∗∗∗ −1.057∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.316)
400+ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.059∗∗∗ −1.751∗∗∗ −1.749∗∗∗
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
(0.193) (0.231) (0.319) (0.405)
Male 0.049 0.049 −0.275∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.052) (0.056) (0.075)
0-17 −2.765∗∗∗ −2.769∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.135)
18-34 −1.461∗∗∗ −1.456∗∗∗ −2.027∗∗∗ −2.031∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.049) (0.046) (0.081)
35-54 −1.135∗∗∗ −1.132∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗ −0.677∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.059) (0.062) (0.102)
Smoker −1.916∗∗∗ −1.915∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.277)
Black −1.796∗∗∗ −1.794∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.176)
Asian −0.677∗∗∗ −0.680∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.106)
White −1.366∗∗∗ −1.365∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.092)
Family 1.850∗∗∗ 1.828∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.082) (0.059) (0.057)
Year 2015 0.417∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.041) (0.064) (0.124)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.176∗
(0.137) (0.212) (0.053) (0.103)
Rating Areas
WA1 1.123∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.085)
CA/WA2 2.322∗∗∗ 2.344∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.201) (0.039) (0.059)
CA/WA3 0.810∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.106) (0.085) (0.146)
WA4 0.277∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗
(0.075) (0.121)
CA4/8 2.330∗∗∗ 2.349∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.130)
CA5 2.228∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.256)
CA6 2.034∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.133)
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
CA7 2.024∗∗∗ 2.047∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.154)
CA9 1.227∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.124)
CA10 −0.260 −0.242∗
(0.165) (0.147)
CA11 −1.210∗∗∗ −1.187∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.118)
CA12 1.509∗∗∗ 1.536∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.090)
CA14 −1.499∗∗∗ −1.478∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.104)
CA15 −0.036 −0.024
(0.114) (0.068)
CA16 0.573∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.063)
CA17 −0.893∗∗∗ −0.884∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.059)
CA18 0.573∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.076)
CA19 0.595∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.090)
Residual −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
eta 0.005 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.004)
Nesting Parameter 0.184∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.176
(0.063) (0.100) (0.076) (0.108)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge
(2010)). Table shows full regression results for the base case and the control function approach of Petrin and Train
(2010)
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Table 13: California Regression Results - Mandate Regressions
Base
No
Mandate
Intercept
Separate
Penalty
No
Mandate
Intercept,
Separate
Penalty
Income
Interaction
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.304∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.117) (0.106) (0.138) (0.080)
Penalty ($100) 0.179 0.027
(0.177) (0.148)
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗ 2.024∗∗ 1.782∗ 2.240∗∗∗
(0.715) (0.792) (0.903) (0.948) (0.684)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.094∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.041) (0.047) (0.049) (0.035)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.184∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.086) (0.098) (0.103) (0.075)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.216∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.101) (0.115) (0.120) (0.088)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.190∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.091) (0.103) (0.108) (0.079)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.091) (0.103) (0.108) (0.079)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.386∗∗ 0.341∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.156) (0.178) (0.186) (0.135)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.027)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.098∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.046) (0.051) (0.053) (0.040)
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.199∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.091) (0.104) (0.109) (0.079)
Valley −0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.050) (0.052) (0.038)
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.045∗∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
250-400 0.095∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.020) (0.032) (0.023) (0.018)
400+ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037) (0.019)
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Base
No
Mandate
Intercept
Separate
Penalty
No
Mandate
Intercept,
Separate
Penalty
Income
Interaction
Male −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
0-17 0.024 0.020 0.026 0.022 0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017)
18-34 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.094∗ −0.116∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.046) (0.049) (0.034)
35-54 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.088∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.096∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.035) (0.041) (0.044) (0.029)
Family 0.186∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.152∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.070) (0.074) (0.081) (0.058)
Year 2015 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mandate −0.060∗∗ −0.054 −0.054∗∗
(0.027) (0.035) (0.021)
Intercept
Base −2.639∗∗∗ −1.776∗∗∗ −2.850∗∗∗ −1.645∗∗ −3.016∗∗∗
(0.724) (0.682) (0.841) (0.806) (0.714)
400+ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.246∗∗∗ −0.679∗∗∗ −1.094∗∗∗ −0.215
(0.193) (0.177) (0.216) (0.201) (0.323)
Male 0.049 0.067 0.037 0.067 0.037
(0.041) (0.050) (0.049) (0.058) (0.040)
0-17 −2.765∗∗∗ −2.751∗∗∗ −2.815∗∗∗ −2.789∗∗∗ −2.732∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.170) (0.158) (0.178) (0.150)
18-34 −1.461∗∗∗ −1.426∗∗∗ −1.416∗∗∗ −1.381∗∗∗ −1.435∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.054)
35-54 −1.135∗∗∗ −1.132∗∗∗ −1.068∗∗∗ −1.086∗∗∗ −1.081∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.065) (0.067) (0.074) (0.063)
Family 1.850∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗∗ 1.903∗∗∗ 1.842∗∗∗ 1.825∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.082) (0.114) (0.118) (0.070)
Year 2015 0.417∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.050) (0.064) (0.062) (0.042)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.122) (0.155)
Mandate x gt400 −0.911∗∗∗
(0.212)
Rating Areas
Continued on next page
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Table 13 – Continued from previous page
Base
No
Mandate
Intercept
Separate
Penalty
No
Mandate
Intercept,
Separate
Penalty
Income
Interaction
CA2 2.322∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗ 2.352∗∗∗ 2.280∗∗∗ 2.299∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.258) (0.251) (0.280) (0.229)
CA3 0.810∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.133) (0.132) (0.145) (0.120)
CA4/8 2.330∗∗∗ 2.341∗∗∗ 2.364∗∗∗ 2.359∗∗∗ 2.319∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.208) (0.199) (0.225) (0.186)
CA5 2.228∗∗∗ 2.301∗∗∗ 2.465∗∗∗ 2.459∗∗∗ 2.218∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.324) (0.341) (0.369) (0.289)
CA6 2.034∗∗∗ 1.960∗∗∗ 1.997∗∗∗ 1.901∗∗∗ 1.959∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.164) (0.159) (0.178) (0.150)
CA7 2.024∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗ 2.084∗∗∗ 2.007∗∗∗ 2.006∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.197) (0.194) (0.215) (0.175)
CA9 1.227∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.200∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.161) (0.156) (0.175) (0.144)
CA10 −0.260 −0.207 −0.224 −0.178 −0.271∗
(0.165) (0.178) (0.186) (0.199) (0.161)
CA11 −1.210∗∗∗ −1.184∗∗∗ −1.188∗∗∗ −1.165∗∗∗ −1.217∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.137) (0.134) (0.148) (0.122)
CA12 1.509∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗ 1.512∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.158) (0.152) (0.170) (0.143)
CA14 −1.499∗∗∗ −1.530∗∗∗ −1.517∗∗∗ −1.564∗∗∗ −1.584∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.130) (0.127) (0.144) (0.118)
CA15 −0.036 −0.005 −0.023 0.007 −0.050
(0.114) (0.123) (0.125) (0.135) (0.112)
CA16 0.573∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.110) (0.113) (0.123) (0.099)
CA17 −0.893∗∗∗ −0.930∗∗∗ −0.864∗∗∗ −0.930∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.107) (0.105) (0.116) (0.096)
CA18 0.573∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.145) (0.175) (0.182) (0.132)
CA19 0.595∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.143) (0.149) (0.157) (0.132)
Nesting Parameter 0.184∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.148∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.069) (0.078) (0.082) (0.060)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge
(2010)). Table shows full regression results for the base and the individual mandate sensitivity runs for California.
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Table 14: Washington Regression Results - Mandate Regressions
Base
No
Mandate
Intercept
Separate
Penalty
No
Mandate
Intercept,
Separate
Penalty
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.530∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗ −0.616∗∗∗ −0.613∗∗∗ −0.558∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.197) (0.139) (0.156) (0.172) (0.110)
Penalty ($100) 0.297∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.038)
Actuarial Value (AV) 1.614∗∗ 1.534∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗ 1.684∗∗∗ 2.031∗∗∗
(0.642) (0.652) (0.507) (0.526) (0.599) (0.431)
HMO 0.287∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.131) (0.109) (0.111) (0.124) (0.098)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011 −0.010 −0.014 −0.013 −0.011 −0.017
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.036)
Centene/Health Net 0.029 0.028 0.035∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
CHPW 0.207∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.088) (0.072) (0.074) (0.082) (0.062)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.099∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.031)
Moda 0.151∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.070) (0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.054)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗ 0.358∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.167) (0.136) (0.139) (0.157) (0.121)
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.304∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.102) (0.088) (0.079) (0.094) (0.073)
250-400 0.325∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.112) (0.097) (0.088) (0.104) (0.080)
400+ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.125) (0.095) (0.094) (0.111) (0.085)
Male −0.017 −0.015 −0.014 −0.015 −0.020 −0.021∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
18-34 −0.124∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.045) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.022)
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – Continued from previous page
Base
No
Mandate
Intercept
Separate
Penalty
No
Mandate
Intercept,
Separate
Penalty
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
35-54 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
Smoker −0.055 −0.051 −0.073∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.060∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033)
Black −0.143∗ −0.133∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗ −0.151∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.079) (0.061) (0.062) (0.077) (0.072)
Asian −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
White 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Family 0.118∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.041) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) (0.022)
Year 2015 0.027∗ 0.026∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Mandate −0.033 −0.046∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.067∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.009) (0.025)
Intercept
Base 0.500 0.690 −0.052 0.318 0.035 −0.462
(0.962) (0.960) (0.797) (0.791) (0.902) (0.683)
138-250 −0.672∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗∗ −0.814∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ −1.196∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.149) (0.116) (0.134) (0.168) (0.095)
250-400 −1.057∗∗∗ −0.977∗∗∗ −1.050∗∗∗ −0.733∗∗∗ −1.565∗∗∗ −1.286∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.290) (0.218) (0.259) (0.286) (0.180)
400+ −1.751∗∗∗ −1.728∗∗∗ −1.275∗∗∗ −1.210∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗ −1.675∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.317) (0.291) (0.333) (0.383) (0.189)
Male −0.275∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.060) (0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.036)
18-34 −2.027∗∗∗ −2.017∗∗∗ −1.939∗∗∗ −1.909∗∗∗ −1.964∗∗∗ −1.818∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.056) (0.046) (0.028)
35-54 −0.676∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ −0.629∗∗∗ −0.609∗∗∗ −0.607∗∗∗ −0.722∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.053) (0.055) (0.063) (0.052)
Smoker −1.916∗∗∗ −1.939∗∗∗ −1.853∗∗∗ −1.899∗∗∗ −1.847∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.115) (0.110) (0.103) (0.113)
Black −1.796∗∗∗ −1.828∗∗∗ −1.792∗∗∗ −1.806∗∗∗ −1.825∗∗∗ −1.810∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.236) (0.192) (0.190) (0.221) (0.192)
Asian −0.677∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗ −0.700∗∗∗ −0.691∗∗∗ −0.721∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.089) (0.074) (0.076) (0.082) (0.057)
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – Continued from previous page
Base
No
Mandate
Intercept
Separate
Penalty
No
Mandate
Intercept,
Separate
Penalty
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
White −1.366∗∗∗ −1.378∗∗∗ −1.448∗∗∗ −1.440∗∗∗ −1.386∗∗∗ −1.526∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.068) (0.057) (0.053) (0.064) (0.056)
Family 0.489∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.052) (0.043)
Year 2015 0.396∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.051) (0.047) (0.059) (0.051)
Mandate 0.181∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.076) (0.109) (0.061)
Mandate x gt400 −1.500∗∗∗
(0.161)
Rating Areas
WA1 1.123∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.050) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.033)
WA2 0.869∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.033)
WA3 0.840∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.087) (0.074) (0.072) (0.085) (0.070)
WA4 0.277∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.063) (0.062) (0.057) (0.067) (0.054)
Nesting Parameter 0.176∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.062) (0.063) (0.071) (0.055)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge
(2010)). Table shows full regression results for the base and the individual mandate sensitivity runs for Washington
state.
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Appendix C: Semi-Elasticities
Table 15: Estimated Own-Premium Semi-Elasticities
California Washington
Overall -19.8 -23.9
Income (% of FPL)
0-138 -24.5 -51.3
138-250 -21.1 -22.4
250-400 -17.3 -20.3
400+ -17.2 -19.6
Gender
Female -17.2 -23.2
Male -20.5 -24.8
Age
18-34 -22.9 -28.7
35-54 -21.3 -23.1
55+ -14.1 -16.9
Smoking Status
Smoker -28.4
Non-Smoker -23.1
Race
Asian -25.8
Black -37.8
White -22.7
Household Size
Single -29.2 -32.5
Family -15.0 -21.3
Renewal Status
Active
Renewal
Mandate Status
Exempt -15.6 -20.9
Subject -20.1 -24.1
Year
2014 -19.6 -25.8
2015 -20.0 -23.2
Notes: Table shows mean own-premium semi-elasticities by demographic group and by state that are computed using
formula (6) in the text.
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Table 16: Estimated Marketplace Coverage Semi-Elasticities
California Washington
Voucher/
No Subsidy
ACA
Subsidies
Voucher/
No Subsidy
ACA
Subsidies
Overall -1.8 -0.4 -2.0 -0.8
Income (% of FPL)
0-138 -2.2 -0.6 -4.4 -1.7
138-250 -1.9 -0.5 -2.0 -0.8
250-400 -1.6 -0.4 -1.9 -0.8
400+ -1.6 -0.4 -1.8 -0.7
Gender
Female -1.6 -0.4 -1.9 -0.7
Male -1.8 -0.4 -2.1 -0.8
Age
18-34 -2.0 -0.5 -2.4 -0.9
35-54 -1.9 -0.4 -1.9 -0.7
55+ -1.3 -0.3 -1.4 -0.5
Smoking Status
Smoker -2.1 -0.7
Non-Smoker -1.7 -0.6
Race
Asian -2.0 -0.7
Black -2.8 -1.0
White -1.7 -0.6
Household Size
Single -2.4 -0.6 -2.6 -1.0
Family -1.2 -0.3 -1.7 -0.6
Mandate Status
Exempt -1.2 -0.3 -1.7 -0.7
Subject -1.6 -0.4 -2.0 -0.8
Year
2014 -1.8 -0.4 -2.1 -0.8
2015 -1.8 -0.4 -1.9 -0.7
Notes: Table shows marketplace coverage semi-elasticities by demographic group and by state that are computed using
formula (8) in the text. In the “voucher/no subsidy” columns, the partial
∂pij
∂pib
is set equal to 0 for all consumers such
that the consumer’s subsidized premium does not respond to changes in the benchmark premium. In the “ACA
subsidies” column,
∂pij
∂pib
= 1 for all subsidized consumers and all plans j ∈ J \ {b}.
Appendix D: Computing Elasticities
In this appendix, I derive the formulas used to compute the elasticities and semi-elasticities estimates
in the main text. Because consumers pay pij ≤ pij for insurance (relative to the outside option), it
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is important to distinguish between elasticities from the consumer’s and insurer’s perspective. Own-
premium elasticities εCij and ε
I
ij from the consumer’s and insurer’s perspective, respectively, for the
nested logit model are given by
εCij ≡
∂ ln sij
∂ ln pij
= αipij
(
1
λ
+
(
λ− 1
λ
)
sij|EX − sij
)
(4)
εIij ≡
∂ ln sij
∂ ln pij
=
(
pij
∂ ln sij
∂pij
)
∂pij
∂pij
= αipij
(
1
λ
+
(
λ− 1
λ
)
sij|EX − sij
)
(5)
for j ∈ J \ {b}, where λ is the nesting parameter and sij|EX is the probability that household i chooses
plan j, conditional on purchasing an exchange plan. Note that the partial
∂pij
∂pij
, which represents how
the consumer’s premium changes with respect to the full premium, equals 1 for all plans except for
the benchmark plan. That is, if the premium for plan j ∈ J \ {b} increases, even subsidized consumers
face the full burden of the increase, provided there is no change in the benchmark plan premium. An
increase in the benchmark premium has no impact on a subsidized consumer’s out-of-pocket premium
(i.e.,
∂pij
∂pij
= 0) because the subsidy will adjust to keep the consumer’s premium constant.
Furthermore, I also compute own-premium semi-elasticities ςij , which provide the percentage change
in demand for an absolute change in the premium. Consistent with the literature, I set the absolute
change equal to $100 per year.17 For j ∈ J \ {b}, own-premium semi-elasticities ςij are computed as
ςij ≡ ∂ ln sij
∂pij
= αi
(
1
λ
+
(
λ− 1
λ
)
sij|EX − sij
)
× (100/12) (6)
Observe that because subsidized consumers are responsible for any absolute increase in the premium
of plan j ∈ J \ {b}, there is no distinction between the consumer’s and insurer’s perspective when
computing own-premium semi-elasticities. For the benchmark plan, ςib = 0.
In addition to own-premium demand, I also calculate marketplace coverage elasticities to assess con-
sumer demand on the extensive margin. I define market coverage elasticities as the percentage change in
demand for marketplace coverage for a percentage change in all marketplace plan premiums, including
the premium of the benchmark plan. Marketplace coverage elasticities %i are computed as
17Note that I use monthly premiums in estimating the nested logit model.
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%i =
∑
j
[
sij|EX
∂ ln siEX
∂ ln pij
(
∂pij
∂pij
−$ij ∂pij
∂pib
)]
=
∑
j
[
sij|EXαipij (1− siEX)
(
∂pij
∂pij
−$ij ∂pij
∂pib
)]
(7)
where siEX is the probability that household i selects a marketplace plan and $ij = pib/pij is the ratio
of benchmark premium to the premium of plan j for household i. As before, the partial ∂pij/∂pij = 1
for all plans j ∈ J \ {b} and ∂pij/∂pij = 0 for j = b. For subsidized consumers, the partial ∂pij/∂pib,
which represents rate of change of the consumer’s out-of-pocket premium with respect to a change in
the benchmark premium, equals 1 for all plans j ∈ J \ {b} (i.e., for every dollar that the benchmark
premium increases, the subsidy increases by a dollar) and equals 0 for j = b. By contrast, ∂pij/∂pib = 0
for consumers ineligible for subsidies.
Observe that the ratio $ij is greater than 1 for plans that are cheaper than the benchmark plan (e.g.,
for a bronze plan), but less than 1 for plans that are more costly than the benchmark plan. As a result,
subsidized consumers pay less for plans that have a smaller premium than the benchmark plan if all
marketplace premiums increase by the same percentage. To illustrate this point with a simple example,
suppose that a consumer receives a subsidy of $100 and can purchase a bronze plan for $200 or the
benchmark silver plan for $250 (and hence the consumer pays $100 for the bronze plan and $150 for the
benchmark plan). If all marketplace premiums increase by 10 percent, then the subsidy will increase to
$125 and the consumer still pays $150 for the benchmark plan. Although the bronze plan premium has
increased to $220, the consumer’s $125 subsidy reduces the out-of-pocket premium to $95, less than
the $100 out-of-pocket premium before the market-wide premium increase. By the same logic, plans
that cost more than the benchmark plan would be more expensive from the perspective of a subsi-
dized consumer if all marketplace premiums increase by the same percentage. Hence, while the ACA’s
subsidy formula largely shields subsidized consumers from premium shocks, it may encourage substi-
tution to less generous plans if there are common market shocks affecting plan premiums proportionally.
This peculiar result may argue for considering marketplace coverage semi-elasticities, which are com-
puted as
ϑi =
∑
j
[
sij|EXαi (1− siEX)
(
∂pij
∂pij
− ∂pij
∂pib
)]
× (100/12) (8)
For all subsidized consumers, the marketplace coverage semi-elasticity ϑi = 0 because ∂pij/∂pij =
∂pij/∂pib (i.e., the subsidy increases by one dollar for every dollar increase in the benchmark pre-
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mium). That is, if all marketplace plans increase by the same absolute amount, subsidized consumers
observe no change in any of their out-of-pocket premiums. Therefore, subsidized consumers are com-
pletely shielded from premium shocks if all marketplace premiums increase by the same amount.
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